Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition of the BDM Method: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing by Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
MISCONCEPTIONS AND GAME FORM RECOGNITION OF THE BDM
METHOD: CHALLENGES TO THEORIES OF REVEALED PREFERENCE
AND FRAMING
Timothy N. Cason
Purdue University
Charles R. Plott
California Institute of Technology
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1364
September 2012
1 
 
Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition  
of the BDM Method: Challenges to Theories  
of Revealed Preference and Framing 
 
Timothy N. Cason‡         Charles Plott§ 
 
September 7, 2012 
 
Abstract 
This study reports a simple experiment using induced-value items to assess the accuracy of the 
Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (BDM) method (1964 Behavioral Science) for measuring 
preferences. Although the BDM mechanism is incentive compatible the data indicate that it can 
be empirically unreliable due to susceptibility to subject misconceptions about the game form. 
The resulting choices appear to reflect preferences constructed through a framing process, but 
further analysis reveals types of misconceptions through specific patterns of behavior. The data 
are more consistent with a hypothesis that the choices represent mistakes, such as a 
misconception that the BDM is a first-price auction mechanism. This highlights that preferences 
should be considered as distinct from choices unless misconceptions are eliminated. Neglecting 
misconceptions and related mistakes can lead the theory of framing and the theory of revealed 
preference to result in incorrect interpretations of data. 
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Section 1. Introduction 
 
The important and growing literature about the nature of preferences often uses the Becker, 
DeGroot and Marschak (1964) method of eliciting and measuring preferences (hereafter, BDM). 
While the BDM is a very powerful tool, inconsistencies of preference measurement across 
different versions of the method and other techniques for eliciting preferences suggest that the 
methodology itself should be examined. The reliability and use of the BDM is closely related to 
a fundamental controversy about the properties of preferences, which is the focus of this paper. 
The controversy has on the one hand the theory of revealed preference, which rests on the 
hypothesis that individuals have preferences over outcomes and those preferences are 
independent of the feasible set of outcomes.  On the other hand, the theory of framing holds that 
preferences are dependent on and perhaps even constructed from the context faced by the 
individual and might have no particular existence outside that context.1 This study provides 
evidence that the widely-used BDM mechanism is a problematic measurement tool, leading to a 
reinterpretation of this controversy because many choices reflect mistakes rather than 
preferences.  
Any pattern of choices can be described as having been produced by some form of 
preference if the set of admissible preferences is sufficiently rich. For any choice, one can 
imagine a preference that could have produced it, suggesting that the theory of preference is not 
falsifiable. The theory of revealed preference was created to explore this issue. Over the decades, 
this theory has evolved to isolate various features of preference consistency together with tests 
that can logically lead to its rejection.  The weak axiom of revealed preference is an example. 
The “integrability” problem in the theory of market demand is another example. A natural 
question presents itself about whether framing theory lends itself to a similar testing process, 
including questions about how framing theory might be rejected.2  Specifically, what form might 
such tests take and under what circumstances might they be used?  
                                                 
1 See Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006). The contrast of ideas is revealed by their summary of the issue: “If different 
elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do 
they exist?” 
2 Some may consider framing as an unstructured catch-all for context dependence, but without structure it is difficult 
to envision how it could be rejectable. If that is the case then it may be premature to take seriously proposals to 
modify policy and law to reflect properties of preferences derived from framing theory. 
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Two possible challenges immediately present themselves as difficulties at a foundational 
level.  First, framing theory often suggests that preferences are built on reference points but the 
general theory does not say exactly what values the reference point parameters take or how such 
parameters might be limited or constrained. However, the literature contains special cases that 
will become useful in the sections that follow.  Second, the preference, which the theory seeks to 
explain, is determined by the context of the measurement including the methods used to measure 
it.  All features of the context are part of the preference-determining frame.  It is a classical 
observer effect: that what is to be measured is influenced by the attempt to measure it. 
To solve the problem, we study commodities for which subjects have clearly identifiable 
preferences. The focus is on commodities, a fundamental building block in economics, as 
opposed to the more abstract concept of “prospects” developed in prospect theory, which can 
differ from person to person and thus reflect personal gains and losses. The focus on commodity 
spaces in economics stems from their central role in connecting preferences to scarce resources, 
the laws of supply and demand (including the need for a common unit of measurement that can 
be summed across agents), market price, equilibrium and efficient allocations. We use a 
preference for those commodities that will not be influenced by the measurement process.  
The exercise is based on an uncontroversial preference, with no risk or uncertainty to 
bring expected- or non-expected utility theories into play. We can therefore use that preference 
to assess the accuracy produced by the BDM measurement method often used in applications of 
framing theory.  The particular preference used is consistent with the classical theory of 
preference found in economics so any tests apply equally to classical preference theory.  An 
accurate theory and method of measurement should accurately return the measurements of things 
for which accurate measurements are known. The method is like using a known weight to test 
the accuracy of a scale. 
The preference is for dollars and for a card that is directly translated into two dollars with 
certainty.  As emphasized by Kahneman et al. (1990, page 1328), this implies that the subjects 
should value the card at its induced value. The rate of substitution for the card and money is 
“two” just like the rate of substitution of two five dollar bills for one ten dollar bill is “two”, 
which should be uncontroversial as it is demonstrated in market transactions every day.  Indeed, 
3 
 
the experiment itself has an internal consistency check on the rate of substitution.3 We pose an 
experiment that is widely used in the classical economics and in studies of framing theory, the 
willingness to accept as measured by the BDM We also perform the experiment in an 
environment which minimizes the influence of the experimenter and training, which have both 
been implicated in affecting measurements in earlier scientific analysis. 
The choices produced by the BDM procedure reflect neither the known preference nor a 
preference with properties postulated by framing theory, and an immediate source of difficulty 
surfaces.  Both the theory of revealed preference and the theory of framing tend to apply a 
labeling convention in which a choice is automatically defined as a preference. The convention 
of calling choices preferences obscures what the preferences really are.  The data suggest that 
choices do not reflect the known preference but instead reflect systematic misconceptions due to 
a “failure of game form recognition (FGFR)”.  Detection of the misconception is subtle because 
the choices have properties that masquerade as coming from the preferences of framing theory. 
That is, major features of the choices are consistent with the properties frequently attributed to 
framing, such as dependence on “reference points.” Indeed, at first glance the experiment 
provides substantial support for framing theories but a complete study yields the opposite 
conclusion. Subject misconceptions and a failure of game form recognition provide an 
alternative and better explanation of the data.  Indeed, once the failure of game form recognition 
is identified and the choices filtered through that theory, the choices are substantially explained 
by the classical preference theory of economics. 
Our focus on economic environments dictates that important features be present: (i) well 
specified commodities are available, (ii) the rules governing the relationships between choices 
and allocations are clearly specified, and (iii) are understood by decision makers.4 Clearly, 
                                                 
3 The card was a thick piece of paper.  The subject could keep the card if she wanted. Unless it was valued as some 
sort of trophy or work of art it had no more value other than scraps of paper. Its only possible value was from giving 
it back to the experimenter and collecting the $2. The subject could keep the card if she placed a value on it that 
exceeded the $2 so the choice to exchange it was value revealing. Of the 264 cases in which subjects faced the 
decision to keep the card or to turn it in for the $2.00 in all 264 cases they took the $2.00, including 217 cases when 
subjects stated a BDM willingness-to-accept value greater than $2.00. Logic, theory, and data reveal that the 
subjective value of the card was the objectively known and uncontroversial $2.00.  
4 Our discussion rests on the convention that preferences, decisions and choices can be separate, but related, 
phenomena.  Furthermore, our focus on issues of preference measurement is distinct from theories of decision 
processes. Both revealed preference theory and framing theory have been criticized as being inadequate theories of 
processes (Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010).  This issue involves substantially different theories from those addressed 
here. Our analysis is restricted to theories about the forms of preferences as opposed to the process that brings them 
into being or the possible relationships between preferences and the process of decision that produces choices.  
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incorrect conclusions will result if an individual is mistaken about the commodity in the sense 
that she thinks the purchase is for an X when she is actually buying a Y, the terms of trade or 
how her choice affects whether she buys or sells. This will be called a failure of game form 
recognition, a failure to recognize the connections between acts and their consequences.5 The 
mistaken choice should not be interpreted as a preference for Y and the subject’s adjustment of 
choice due to a suspected or realized mistake should not be considered a failure of rationality, 
but rather a misunderstanding/misconception of the task.  This is why a preference need not be 
defined by a choice and why the two concepts, preference and choice, should be recognized as 
different and kept separate. The view is that a theory of mistakes is an alternative to non-standard 
preferences, a view that can be found expressed by others (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2008). 
A simple hypothetical example illustrates some of the delicate issues among the concepts 
of preference, framing and misconceptions. Consider the task represented in Figure 1 in which 
the subject is given a monetary incentive to choose a specific oval.  As a subject you are asked to 
follow the instructions and chose one of the ovals as directed.  You are paid if you choose 
exactly as directed. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
                            
 
 
 
  . 
 
 
If you are like many people you will not see that your maximum payoff occurs if and 
only if you choose the small oval on the left.  You will be misled by a well-known optical 
                                                 
5 The concept reflects the traditional tools of game theory in which distinctions are made among acts, outcomes, and 
game structure that connects acts to outcomes, preferences over outcomes, and decisions that are the choices from 
among acts.  Much economic theory proceeds on the assumption that these elements are known. When the elements 
are not known information and information sets are key concepts that might be extended to deal with the lack of 
information about the game form but is not be part of the analysis here.  
Consider the following task. Study the ovals below.  You will earn 
$20 if you mark an X through the correct one. 
Study them carefully.     Now, to earn the $20 you must choose  
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Adding the additional information of the lines to the context helps the subject clearly understand 
the task, and the choice may change even though the task and incentives were not changed. A 
context effect would be observed but the underlying preference would not have changed. The 
point is that an actual preference for ovals was not observed when the task was misunderstood. 
 Adding the thick lines above and below the puzzle pieces could be interpreted as 
changing the frame, and thus according to framing theory it could change the preference and 
reflect a violation of a “principle of procedural invariance”.6 But in this example, as in our 
experiment with an induced value object worth $2, it is nonsensical to think of the frame change 
leading to a preference change. This is a task where subjects (if they understand the game form) 
have an unambiguous preference for the left oval. Any choice other than that must indicate a 
misconception of the game form/task. 
Of course, a proper perception of the game form is assumed by the theory of revealed 
preference and is closely tied to the context of choice, including the actions used to produce 
choices.  There would seem to be little disagreement that choices based on mistakes do not 
reflect revealed preferences over commodities any more than would be the case if the context 
included a magician’s “sleight of hand”, fraud or print too small to read. Yet, the sources of 
mistakes can be subtle and the evolution of perception is complex.  The substance of this paper 
concerns how mistakes can arise, be identified and be documented. 
Failures of game form recognition have been documented in the experimental literature 
(e.g., Rydval et al., 2009; Chou et al., 2009).  Indeed systematic mistakes by economic decision 
makers are an integral part of the theory itself.7 The data presented here show that the failure can 
occur in the simple BDM task where it might not be recognized by researchers and instead be 
interpreted as something else, such as a preference based on reference points or other framing 
effects. Researchers understand the truthful revelation incentives of the BDM, but to many 
subjects the BDM may appear as confusing as the initial instruction to choose the left oval.  
                                                 
6 Procedural invariance says that the preference order should be invariant regardless of what procedure is used to 
elicit the preferences. 
7 Many economic theories rely on a systematic failure of game form recognition. Examples include price taking 
behavior in the competitive model, price adjustments in partial equilibrium settings, temporary equilibria, Nash 
responses in dynamic settings, and monopoly in general equilibrium. Occasionally, this property of the theory to 
incorporate mistakes as an integral part of the theory is not recognized. Patterns of mistakes can be systematically 
characterized and incorporated into the models in ways that maintain the basic principles and parsimony across 
applications (see the discussion at Plott, 1996). 
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Our interest in the issue is motivated by a sequence of questions.  (1) Is the BDM reliable 
as a tool for measuring preferences? When applying the method do the data reveal a preference 
that we know exists?  (2) What is the source of any unreliability detected and how can we 
measure it? In particular, can the lack of reliability be traced to systematic mistakes?  (3) Can the 
data be misinterpreted as support for theories based on the existence of preferences affected by 
framing effects?  (4) What are the implications of the experiment for the theory of revealed 
preference and the theory of framing together with patterns of experiments that suggest 
preferences are labile?   
We emphasize that our interest is not in exploring how more elaborate instructions and 
training of subjects in the use of the BDM can “improve” its ability to reveal preferences more 
accurately. While such a task might be very useful for some purposes, it is an aside to the issue 
we pose.  Furthermore, a problem resides in the fact that such training can be interpreted as 
changes of the framing of the BDM elicitation method and thus according to framing theory, 
training can change the preference that the BDM is supposed to measure. Thus, whether 
“improved BDM measurement” can lead to the possibility of rejecting framing theory is 
questionable. A similar issue arises for other preference measurement methods, such as the 
multiple price list method used in some versions of the BDM.  
The outline of the paper is as follows.  An underlying theme is that the object we wish to 
measure, subject preferences over well-defined commodities, need not be reflected in subject 
choice from among available actions.  This theme is well known in economics and decision 
theory but can be overlooked in the world of experiments where a presumption of experimental 
control exists. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the BDM method of preference 
measurement as applied to our experiments. We describe the preference over alternatives if the 
subject is fully informed about the relationship between the choice from among alternatives and 
the consequences of those choices.  The analysis relies on an assumption that this preference is 
not controversial and that any successful measurement should produce this preference as the 
measurement. Any measurement that produces some other preference is flawed.   
Section 3 explains our experimental environment (procedures, subjects and instructions). The 
procedures were designed to minimize the presence of the experimenter so theories about 
experimenter influence cannot surface to confound the results.  Section 4 presents an initial look 
at the empirical results and shows that the objective, induced preference described in Section 2 is 
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not consistent with the choice data. Section 5 explores why the choice data do not reflect the 
known preference. In particular, the section examines some popular models in the context of the 
experimental data (e.g., reference points, anchoring and adjustment, mistakes) and finds that 
some patterns of choices reflect properties suggested by these framing theories. By construction, 
however, we know that these theories cannot be a proper explanation since the preference is 
induced and known. This section presents additional examination of the data and demonstrates 
that the choices reflect a misconception about the task—a mistake about the BDM process. 
Estimates of a simple structural model of errors lead to the conclusion that a majority of subjects 
initially misunderstand the BDM rules. Section 6 contains conclusions and final observations.  
 
Section 2. The BDM, Preferences and Possible Mistakes 
 
The BDM mechanism has a long history of use as a tool for measuring preferences.  The subject 
is required to state a dollar value for an object, such as a mug or a lottery. The stated dollar value 
is compared to a randomly drawn price. If the measurement is a buying exercise, the subject buys 
at the randomly determined price if it is less than the subject’s stated value.  If the measurement 
is a selling exercise, then the subject receives the randomly drawn price if it is above the 
subject’s stated value. Because the subject does not determine the price paid or received, only 
whether it is paid or received, she has a dominant strategy to state her true value. The subject 
cannot lose by accurately stating her preferences for the objects and might gain. The mechanism 
is popular because unmotivated expressions of preferences for objects that are collected by 
alternative methods need not be (theoretically) accurately expressed.   
The basic theory of the mechanism finds application to wide areas of economics that 
focus on policy and institutional design including auctions and public goods. For example, it 
shares the same (dominant strategy) incentive properties as the second-price Vickrey auction. It 
is also widely used as a tool for preference measurement in growing and important new subfields 
of economics such as behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. 
The reliability of the BDM has been the subject of considerable research and our 
experimental design is extremely simple relative to the applications found in the literature.8  In 
                                                 
8 E.g., Bohm et al., 1997; Irwin et al., 1998; Grether et al. 2007; James, 2007; Urbancic, 2011; Kagel and Levin 
(indirectly through the study of second-price auctions).  While the results have been mixed it survives as a useful 
tool, and researchers have employed it in various ways. Its performance appears better when buying or selling prices 
9 
 
part, the simplicity of our design is dictated by a need to strip the experiment from other potential 
explanatory variables that can be found in the more complex applications.  Our approach is a bit 
“upside down” from the usual applications of BDM where the preference for the object is not 
known and is sought through the application of BDM.  By contrast we use an object for which 
the preference is known and clearly defined: money. The objective of our experiment is to 
determine if the application of BDM to measure the preference, as if we did not know what the  
 
Front Side of Card     Back Side of Card 
 
Figure 2: Decision Form Used in Both Rounds 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
are chosen from a price list (Vossler and McKee, 2006; Murphy et al., 2010), although the use of a coarse grid of 
possible valuations does not provide narrowly-defined valuation estimates and thus a relatively weak test. Some 
studies have “trained” subjects on its revelation incentives using objects of known, objective value before using it to 
value things of interest (e.g., lotteries, products), e.g., Noussair et al. (2004a; 2004b). Others have trained subjects 
using different lotteries before eliciting values of objects (Plott and Zeiler, 2005; later comments by Isoni et al. 
(2011) put these training procedures at the center of the discussion). Researchers have also used examples and 
explained the strategy of the process and why it is theoretically incentive compatible. 
This ticket is worth $2.00 to you.
You can sell it.
Name your offer price _________________________.
Located under the tape on the other side of this card 
is a posted price.
The posted price was drawn randomly between:
[$ __________ and $ __________ ]
If your offer price is below the posted price on the 
back of the card then you sell your ticket at the posted 
price. 
If your offer price is above the posted price on the 
back of the card then you do not sell your ticket but 
you do collect the $2.00 value of the ticket.
You can view the posted price after you have 
named your price.
Posted price is under the tape.  To be viewed only 
after you have named your offer price on the other 
side.
Circle the appropriate amount and print your name so 
we can pay you.
My offer price is below the posted price.
Pay me the posted price of $_______________.
My offer price is above the posted price. 
Pay me $ 2.00.
Name _____________________________________
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preference is, returns an accurate measure of the preference that we know exists. It is a test of 
measurement accuracy and reliability since people prefer more money to less. In essence, our 
experiment amounts to giving subjects an opportunity to express a preference for money stated in 
the context of a BDM method of preference measurement.  The opportunity given the subjects is 
shown in Figure 2.  Subjects are handed the card exactly as displayed, with the left half of the 
figure on the front side of the card and the right half on the back. The first sentence explains that 
card is worth $2.00.  Subjects are instructed to state an offer price that amounts to a minimal 
selling price for the card.  A posted price is randomly drawn from the interval [0, $݌̅] where the 
lower and upper limits is clearly printed on the card and the upper limit differs across subjects. If 
the posted price is above the subject’s offer price the subject is paid the posted price and if not 
the subject is paid the $2.00 for the card.  After the subject states an offer price, the opaque tag 
on the back can be removed.9 After she reveals the posted price the subject computes the amount 
received for the card as determined by her offer price and the randomly determined posted price. 
In this choice situation, a subject who prefers more money to less has a dominant strategy 
of stating $2.00 as an offer price.  Failure to state $2.00 reflects a mistake. A subject offering a 
price higher than $2.00 will never receive more and can receive less for the card than a subject 
offering $2.00.  If the subject offers $2.00 for the card, he receives $2.00 if the random posted 
price is less than or equal to $2.00 but he receives the posted price whenever the posted price is 
above $2.00.  For example, if the subject offers $2.00 and if the posted price is $2.00+X he will 
receive the $2.00+X and will never receive less than the $2.00 offer price. But if the subject 
offers more than $2.00, say $2.00+Y, she receives the posted price whenever the posted price is 
greater than or equal $2.00+Y and if the posted price is less than $2.00+Y she is paid $2.00 for 
the card. Thus, subjects who offer the card at values strictly greater than $2.00 redeem the card at 
$2.00 when the posted price is above $2.00 but below the subject’s offer price.  Basically, a 
failure to offer $2.00 means that subject simply failed to take the opportunity to receive money 
when available and we know that is something that the subjects do not want to do.  The decision 
must rest on a misconception, mistake or confusion. 
To verify that the failure to take money when available was a mistake the experiment 
included a repeat decision in which subjects are given the opportunity to correct the mistake 
                                                 
9 Notice that the procedure removes the possibility that the posted price might depend on the subject’s offer price.  It 
also largely removes the experimenter from personal contact with the subject.  Thus, concerns based on how the 
behavior of the experimenter might influence the subjects do not apply. 
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when faced with a nearly identical choice.  After the subject completes the question on the back 
of the card, which reinforces attention on the rules and the possible outcomes, the subject turns 
the card in.  After the first cards are collected the subjects are given another card exactly like the 
first, except the $݌̅ on the second card is usually different from the $݌̅ on the first card but due to 
the randomness they are sometimes the same. Again, the correct response if the subject 
understands the options correctly is to offer a price of $2.00.  
The application of BDM in this environment differs from typical applications along four 
dimensions.  First, unlike the typical application of BDM we know the preference that should be 
revealed.  The card has a clear cash value stated in the first sentence which is further explained 
on the front of the card, and it has no other outside value.  It has no intrinsic value.  The subject 
is acting in isolation so there is no value associated with a social context. The card has no 
enhancement values that might be created by using words like “gift”. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the difference between the card and cash is no different than the difference between 
two five dollar bills and one ten dollar bill, an indifference that is expressed daily in transactions.  
Thus, the analysis proceeds on the proposition that the value of the card to the subject is 
objectively known to be $2.00, allowing a test of whether or not the BDM produced an accurate 
preference measurement.  Second, the choice is repeated with the same structure of preference, 
an object valued at $2, only with a randomly determined different upper limit of the posted price 
– basically a repeated measurement of the same preference using the same instructions. Third, 
the answers to the questions on the back of the card provide evidence of how the subject 
perceived the task.  
The fourth dimension is important.  The nature of the questions answered at the 
completion of the first card could expose the subject to evidence that the subject made a mistake. 
If the posted price was above $2.00 and below the subject’s offer price he can see that by stating 
a lower price he would have received more money.  Thus the subject is exposed to evidence of a 
possible mistake.  If the choice was indeed a mistake as opposed to an accurate statement of 
preference, and the subject perceives this as a mistake, then the subject would change behavior in 
the direction of a stated price of $2.00.  Thus, the experimental design can produce evidence of 
failure of game form recognition.  With the data in hand we then ask if the choice is better 
explained as mistake due to a failure of game form recognition or by a theory of constructed 
preference based on a process of framing. That examination is contained in Section 5. 
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Section 3. Experimental Task and Procedures  
 
Data were collected from 245 subjects during the first 10 minutes of seven sections of Purdue 
University microeconomics principles classes that were not taught by the experimenters. One of 
the experimenters, assisted by 2 or 3 research assistants, simply passed out (face up, shown on 
the left side of the figure) the decision cards shown in Figure 2. Although all cards indicated an 
induced and known “face value” of $2.00, it was not common knowledge that all cards had the 
same face value. The experimenter orally described this classroom activity as a “simple exercise 
to understand how people make decisions.” He asked subjects not to talk, and to read the front of 
the card and indicate their offer price carefully since the money they receive can depend on their 
answer. They were told to turn over the card after indicating this price, look under the taped tab, 
and write the amount they should be paid. The class sizes were relatively small (30 to 40 
students) in arena-style seating, and the experimenter and assistants observed subjects carefully 
and none were seen violating the experiment rules. 
Once all cards were collected, a second card was passed out. This second decision round 
was not announced in advance. The card was identical to the first, except that it was a different 
color and the maximum posted price varied randomly across subjects. Subjects were paid for 
both card answers, using sealed envelopes of cash distributed when class was dismissed. 
Earnings ranged between $3.05 and $13.66, with an average of $6.11 per subject. 
The cards were identical except for the range for the uniformly-distributed random posted 
price. The minimum posted price was always $0, but the maximum posted price was $4, $5, $6, 
$7, or $8. Each of these ranges was assigned one-fifth of the cards. While the range does not 
affect the theoretical incentive-compatibility of the BDM mechanism, as discussed in Section 5 it 
does influence the expected payoff consequences of suboptimal offer prices.  
 
Section 4 Results: Data Patterns 
 
The prominent patterns of the data are reviewed here and stated as a series of results.  The first 
two results indicate that the proportion of optimal choices ($2.00) is not high but increases 
substantially on the second choice. The third, fourth, and fifth results summarize the relationship 
between the pattern of “optimal” choices, experience and subsequent choice. 
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Result 1: With simple instructions and no training or feedback, the BDM does not provide 
reliable measures of preferences for the induced-value object. 
Support: Figure 3A displays the distribution of offer prices chosen by the 245 subjects during 
the first round, pooling across the maximum offer price treatments. Only 41 out of the 245 (16.7 
percent) subjects chose offers within 5 cents of the $2 true value. A greater fraction of subjects 
chose offers near $3 and near $4 than near the optimal offer.  
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Figure 3A: Offer Price Distribution on First Choice
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Result 2: A second round of decisions (including subjects re-reading the instructions and after 
receiving feedback) nearly doubles the number of subjects stating the correct valuation. 
Support: Figure 3B shows that the number of subjects indicating an offer price within 5 cents of 
the $2 true value increases to 76 out of 244 (31.1 percent) on the second, repeat decision.10 The 
data strongly reject the null hypothesis that the rate that subjects state an offer price within 5 
cents of $2 is equal on the first and second decisions (Fisher’s exact test p-value<0.01). 
 
Result 3: Subjects that chose the theoretically optimal offer price (near $2) on the first card also 
usually choose the theoretically optimal offer price on the second card.  Subjects who did not 
choose optimally on the first card tend to choose a different offer price on the second card. 
Support: Of the 244 subjects, 203 did not choose the theoretical optimum (within 5 cents of $2) 
on the first card.  Of these 203, 159 (78%) chose a different offer price on the second card and 44 
(22%) indicated the same offer price. Of 244 subjects, 41 chose near $2 on the first card. Of 
these 41, 35 (85%) chose the same offer price and 6 (15%) chose a different offer price on the 
second card. The hypothesis that the stability of choice is the same for those who chose 
optimally and those who did not choose optimally on the first card is strongly rejected (Fisher’s 
exact test p-value<0.01). 
These results demonstrate that the misconceptions subjects apparently have about the 
BDM procedure are distinct from framing effects. A natural interpretation is that the frame 
changes when subjects observe different upper limits of the posted price. However, many 
subjects who received the exact same upper limit in the two rounds and did not choose optimally 
in the first round changed their offer price in the second round. In particular, 26 of the 46 
subjects (57%) who observed the same upper bound (and thus the exact same frame) in rounds 1 
and 2 but who did not offer within 5 cents of $2 in the first round changed their offer in the 
second round. While non-optimal subjects who received a different upper limit in the two rounds 
changed their offer price more frequently (133 out of 157, 85%), framing theory cannot explain 
the frequent change in behavior even when the frame stayed the same across rounds. Moreover, 
those subjects who chose optimal responses (presumably those with no misconceptions) tend to 
have stable choices, even when the frame (interpreted as the random price upper bound) changes.  
                                                 
10 The number of observations decreases to 244 on the second decision because one subject did not write his offer 
price on his second card. 
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Result 4 illustrates data patterns that could be attributed to a theory of framing based on 
this interpretation that the random price upper bound determines the frame.  Result 5 below 
provides more direct evidence that subjects learn across rounds and how the feedback subjects 
receive at the end of round 1 affects how they adjust their offer price in round 2.  These two 
features of the data will play an important role in determining the nature of game form 
misconceptions. 
 
Result 4: For both the first and second round choices the pattern of non-optimal price offers are 
related to the maximum of the posted price range. 
Support: Table 1 summarizes the mean price offers for each of the 5 upper bounds in the two 
rounds for offers not within 5 cents of $2. The trend is for offers and standard errors to increase 
in the upper bound, with only a couple of exceptions. Median offers (not shown) also generally 
increase with the upper bound. Table 2 indicates that the differences in offers for different upper 
bounds is statistically significant in most pairwise tests, similar to findings in Bohm et al. (1997). 
The frequency that subjects offer near $2 is not systematically related to the upper bound. 
 
Table 1: Mean Price Offers for Each Posted Price Range Maximum, Excluding Offers 
within 5 Cents of $2 
 
Panel A: Round 1 
 Range [0, $4] Range [0, $5] Range [0, $6] Range [0, $7] Range [0, $8] 
Mean Offer 2.98 3.35 3.50 3.93 3.80 
(Std. Error) (0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.21) 
Observations 45 39 39 40 41 
Percent Offer 
$2±0.05 10% 19% 22% 17% 16% 
 
Panel B: Round 2 
 Range [0, $4] Range [0, $5] Range [0, $6] Range [0, $7] Range [0, $8] 
Mean Offer 2.73 3.08 3.37 3.85 4.16 
(Std. Error) (0.13) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19) (0.36) 
Observations 32 35 28 41 32 
Percent Offer 
$2±0.05 32% 27% 44% 18% 35% 
 
Result 5: Subjects who were “exposed” to their mistake (in the sense that a different offer 
amount would have increased their payoff) were more likely to choose a correct offer in round 2. 
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Support: One problem with the BDM is that incorrect offer prices are financially punished 
infrequently (Harrison, 1992). In the present context, for example, if a subject states an offer 
price for the card that is greater than $2 but the random posted price exceeds this offer price, then 
this subject could not have increased her payment by choosing any other offer. We define a 
subject as “exposed” to her mistake if an alternative offer could have increased her payment. 
This occurs when the posted price is greater than $2 but less than the subject’s offer price, or 
when the posted price is less than $2 but greater than the subject’s offer. Only 57 of the 204 
subjects (28 percent) who incorrectly offered an amount more than 5 cents away from $2 in 
round 1 were exposed to their mistake. Table 3 displays the directional shift in offers from round 
1 to round 2 for those subjects who were exposed to their mistake and those who were not 
exposed. Fisher’s exact tests reveal that those who were exposed were significantly more likely 
to jump to $2 (p-value=0.049) and significantly less likely to move even further away from $2 
(p-value=0.024) on round 2.11 
 
Table 2: Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Tests Comparing Offers for Different Posted Price Ranges 
 
Panel A: Round 1 
 Range [0, $4] Range [0, $5] Range [0, $6] Range [0, $7] 
Range [0, $5] 0.013    
Range [0, $6] 0.001 0.176   
Range [0, $7] 0.000 0.007 0.135  
Range [0, $8] 0.000 0.003 0.076 0.784 
 
Panel B: Round 2 
 Range [0, $4] Range [0, $5] Range [0, $6] Range [0, $7] 
Range [0, $5] 0.007    
Range [0, $6] 0.001 0.474   
Range [0, $7] 0.000 0.005 0.056  
Range [0, $8] 0.000 0.007 0.040 0.423 
 
Note: Tests exclude offers within 5 cents of $2. Table entries denote p-values for two-tailed 
Wilcoxon tests. 
 
                                                 
11 These figures are based on a transformation of the offers to the ratio (offer-$2)/(݌̅ -$2), where ݌̅ is the maximum 
random posted price draw, since subjects might have faced two different upper bounds and the adjustment relative to 
the optimum can be sensitive to this maximum possible price. Results are similar when defining movements using 
the raw offers, rather than with this normalization, although the p-value for the difference in propensity to move 
away from $2 becomes 0.082. 
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Table 3: Adjustment of Round 1 to Round 2 Offer Prices for Subjects Choosing Incorrectly 
on Round 1 
 Exposed to Round 1 Error Not Exposed to Round 1 Error 
Total Subjects 57 (100%) 146 (100%) 
Move Onto Optimum ($2) 16 (28%) 24 (16%) 
Move Towards Optimum 24 (42%) 57 (39%) 
Choose Same Offer Ratio 9 (16%) 24 (16%) 
Move Away From Optimum 8 (14%) 41 (28%) 
Note: Movements are based on offer ratio=(offer-$2)/(݌̅ -$2), where ݌̅ is the maximum random 
posted price draw.  
 
 Figure 4 illustrates the movements toward and away from the optimal $2 offer using the 
ratio=(offer-$2)/(݌̅ -$2), where ݌̅ is the maximum random posted price draw. By construction of 
this ratio, 0 is the optimum. No “bubbles” are on the vertical axis because this figure excludes 
the 41 subjects who chose the optimal offer in round 1. (As already noted, those subjects nearly 
always chose optimally in round 2 as well.) Bubbles on the 45-degree line indicate subjects who 
chose offers to maintain a consistent ratio in both rounds. (The largest bubble representing the 
most subjects is at (0.5, 0.5), and 62 subjects chose offers that led to a ratio of 0.5 on at least one 
of the rounds. This is a significant incorrect ratio discussed in the next section.) Bubbles below 
the 45-degree line usually indicate movements toward the optimal ratio of 0, and bubbles above 
the 45-degree line indicate movements away from the optimal offer. Panel A shows how offers 
change among subjects who were not exposed to their error, and they are scattered both above 
and below the 45-degree line. By contrast, Panel B indicates a more systematic movement 
among subjects exposed to their error, below the 45-degree line and towards or onto the optimal 
ratio of 0. 
 
Section 5. Results: Models 
 
Three classes of general theories can be tested and compared for analysis of our experimental 
results: A. theories based on framing; B. theories based on random choice; C. theories based on 
game form misconceptions.  Theories within a class tend to rest on the same or similar basic 
principles but the basic principles differ across classes.  As will be demonstrated our data exhibit 
support for prominent features of framing theories, which appears to be inconsistent with the 
claim (originally offered in Kahneman et al. 1990) that the preference for the card is objective,  
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constant and known.  If the preference was not known, one could easily conclude that the 
preference for the commodities resulted from framing. However, a close examination of the 
choices demonstrates that a case for framing is not convincing. The data are better and more 
completely explained by a specific type of game form misconception. A discussion of the 
general theory of framing is reserved for Section 6. 
 
A. THEORIES OF FRAMING.   
Four theories derived from the theory of framing are applicable in our experiment, and the data 
exhibit patterns often interpreted as confirming evidence for them.  We shall argue below, 
however, that a completely different assessment emerges when comparing these patterns to 
theories of mistakes stemming from game form misconceptions, Before turning to that 
assessment, consider first the four theories based on framing listed below. 
 Endowment effect/reference points:  Those names suggest that the data reflect a special 
factor such as the “endowment” or a “reference point” from which utility losses loom 
greater than gains.  This leads to a “kink” in the utility function at the endowment, the 
reference point in this frame, so the asking price for the item (willingness to accept) is 
greater than the buying price (willingness to pay). According to framing theory, 
possession (ownership) of the object creates a sense of loss should the object be sold or 
given up in exchange.  Since the object is a card worth $2 some might question whether 
the necessary “sense of ownership” will develop, and whether or not an “endowment 
effect” will be observed.  However, the data clearly show BDM measurements of 
willingness to accept that are substantially more than $2, which we can confidently 
conjecture is more than the willingness the pay for a $2 card.  These patterns are reported 
in Results 1, 2, and 4.  Thus, since the WTA greater than the WTP an “endowment 
effect” is observed, just as the theory would predict (Kahneman et al., 1990, 2008; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).  Furthermore, one might conclude that sellers require 
compensation for the consumption value of the ticket plus additional value for the loss of 
the ticket, creating a positive relationship between the value of the ticket and the upper 
bound of the draw. Indeed, these data are consistent with what some would describe as a 
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“widely observed” pattern in the literature.12  Thus, whether or not an endowment effect 
applies can be debated but there can be no debate about the fact that the data have 
properties that are predicted by the theory. 
 Anchor and adjustment: This theory holds that the frame centers the subject’s focus on 
the prominent feature of the good and assesses the value, and then creates a value of the 
good by adjusting for other features (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). A reasonable assumption is that the prominent feature of the BDM in 
our application is the upper bound of the posted price range. Subjects could focus 
attention on the maximum possible value and then construct their preference through an 
adjustment downward based on probabilities or characteristics of the card, but with an 
incomplete adjustment that might not consider the strategic issues.  The result would tend 
to be a value above $2 as is observed and the positive relationship between the upper 
bound and the offers reported in Result 4 could be interpreted as further support. 
 Attraction to the maximum: Similar to anchoring, this theory holds that a psychological 
“pull” to the maximum payoff (posted price range) draws decisions to it (Urbancic, 
2011). The maximum serves as a reference point used for the construction of a preference 
that depends on the distribution governing the outcomes in the BDM.  Presumably this 
preference is accurately measured by the BDM mechanism. The preference will be 
influenced by the location of the maximum, which is consistent with Result 4.  
 Expectations of a trade (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006): Anticipating selling the item 
means losing the item for a gain in money.  Depending on the anticipated selling price 
losses loom greater than gains, which motivates an offer price that is above the buying 
price of the item.  It is a form of endowment effect and the theoretical mechanism applies 
directly through lotteries and the expectations of a trade.  While the expectations of 
trading are not directly observed, Kőszegi and Rabin’s model makes predictions that 
depend on the assumptions made about expectations for trades.  In particular they note 
that if the subject does not expect to trade then a loss aversion effect will be observed.  
However if the subject does expect to trade then the effect would depend on the subject 
expectations. Since the WTA is greater than the (presumed) WTP in our experiments, 
                                                 
12 For example, Knetsch et al. (2001, page 257) state that “The endowment effect and loss aversion have been 
among the most robust findings of the psychology of decision making. People commonly value losses much more 
than commensurate gains…” 
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without looking deeper into the data, a natural interpretation is that the subjects expect 
not to trade and that the predictions of the Kőszegi and Rabin model are supported. 
Results 1, 2 and 4 contain the appropriate data. 
 
Theories of framing appear to be consistent with parts of the behavior observed in the 
experiment. Other results do not support framing theory. Result 3 demonstrates that subjects who 
choose according to classical theory tend to repeat this choice. But contrary to framing theory 
that means that they are not influenced by a change in frame (as the change in upper limit that 
many experienced could be interpreted). More importantly, based on the convention of defining 
choices as preferences, the theories are reporting to have identified and measured a preference 
contrary to what was induced. We know that the true preference for the card is $2 but framing 
theories fail to produce that preference measurement. Result 4 demonstrates that subjects who 
exhibit the features exhibited by theories of framing tend to be those that change their choice 
when given the same option again.  Contrary to framing theory, however, part of Result 3 
indicates that for many subjects the frame remains the same but the choice changes. Subjects 
exposed to their possible misconception tend to correct it in the direction predicted by classical 
theory (Result 5) onto or towards the optimal choice. The patterns of choices across rounds 
(Results 3 and 5) are more consistent with learning than framing. 
 
B.  FLAT PAYOFF-LACK OF INCENTIVES TO REVEAL 
Over two decades ago Harrison (1992) highlighted the weak incentives provided by the BDM for 
truthful revelation of preferences, in the context of his well-known “flat payoff” critique of 
preference measurement; see also Irwin et al. (1998). Some subjects may understand the 
instructions and the BDM task but they could make errors, and a key observation is that errors 
are very “cheap” in the BDM because they often are not penalized through financial losses. As 
already documented, in the present dataset only 28 percent of subjects who bid more than 5 cents 
away from the correct offer of $2 suffered any monetary cost from their suboptimal bid. 
Moreover, the likelihood of being exposed to a mistake is lower as the upper range of the random 
price distribution increases, and the expected cost of an error of any given size is smaller as the 
range of random price draws increases.  
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In particular, the expected loss from a suboptimal bid can be calculated as follows: 
Denote the offer price chosen by the subject as b and the randomly-drawn posted price as 
݌~ܷሾ0, ݌̅ሿ with maximum ݌̅ ∈ ሼ4, 5, 6, 7, 8ሽ. The expected payoff is 
E[π] = 2*prob(b>p) + E(p|p>b)prob(p>b), which simplifies for the uniform distribution to 
 Eሾߨሿ ൌ 1݌̅ ቈ2ܾ ൅
݌̅ଶ െ ܾଶ
2 ቉ (1)
This can be differenced from the payoff of optimal offer price b*=2 to calculate the expected loss 
for any offer price other than the optimal offer price of $2, given ݌̅. 
 
 
Figure 5: Expected Loss Relative to Optimal Price Offer for Different Maximum Prices 
 
For example, the likelihood that a subject indicating a suboptimal offer price of $3.00 
will see a random draw between $2 and $3 indicating a loss relative to the correct offer price of 
$2.00 is 1/8 when the range is [$0, $8] but is 1/4 when the range is [$0, $4]. Figure 5 illustrates 
the expected losses for the 5 different ranges employed in the experiment. The expected loss 
from a suboptimal offer price is quite small even for offers as much as $1 away from the 
optimum, but note also that this loss is twice as great when the random posted price ranges 
between [$0, $4] rather than [$0, $8]. This suggests that more errors (and thus higher average 
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offer prices) will occur for higher upper bounds for the random price draws, as already 
documented in the data (Result 4). Note that this is simply a model of random mistakes, which 
are more likely to occur when they are less costly. This is not an actual misconception of the 
BDM mechanism. In what follows we will refer to this as the “optimal” or “correct” model with 
noise. 
 
C.  FAILURE OF GAME FORM RECOGNITION 
The theory of game form misconception in this context holds that the patterns of data are not due 
a preference that evolved from framing but are due to mistakes. Moreover, the mistakes are not 
simply random departures from a correct understanding of the experimental task, but rather arise 
from a systematic misconception of the rules of the BDM. In order to make a case that the 
choices reflect a systematic, fundamental mistake the mistake itself is described and stated in a 
form that yields testable predictions that are comparable to the predictions of other possible 
models. 
A specific type of misconception was suggested by a particular type of error revealed on 
the cards filled out by some subjects. Recall that subjects were asked to write on the back side of 
their card the amount they should be paid after looking under an opaque tab covering their 
random offer price. Twenty-nine of the subjects indicated that they should be paid their offer 
price even when their offer price was less than the randomly-drawn posted price on their 
decision card.13 It is as if the subjects believe the payment mechanism is similar to a first price 
procurement in which the lowest bid wins and is paid the bid price. An additional 82 subjects 
may have had this first-price auction misconception, but our data do not directly reveal it 
because on both of their cards their bid was above the drawn random price.14 
This type of mistake suggests that some subjects believe that the buyer accepts the lower 
price, where the subject’s offer price is in competition with the random posted price; and if they 
do not win this competition (i.e., if they do not have the lower price) then they are paid the $2 
value on the retained card. In other words, they perceive their expected payoff to be  
                                                 
13 We noted these mistakes when viewing their cards to prepare the money payment envelopes, and subjects were 
paid the correct amount—which was the higher drawn posted price in these cases. 
14 Two additional types of possible game form misconceptions are suggested by the data but were so sparse in the 
data that we do not pursue them.  A few subjects seemed to think that they would be paid their bid independent of 
the posted price and thus stated asking prices equal to the maximum of the range. A few other subjects appeared to 
think that they only received a value if their asking price was below the posted price and thus stated an asking price 
below $2.00.  
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 E[π]' = 2prob(b>p) + bprob(p>b), (2) 
where again the offer price chosen by the subject is b and the randomly-drawn posted price is 
݌~ܷሾ0, ݌̅ሿ. (The mistake here is that b replaces the correct E(p|p>b) in the second term of the 
expression.) For the uniform distribution this simplifies to  
 Eሾߨሿᇱ ൌ 1݌̅ ሾ2ܾ ൅ ܾሺ݌̅ െ ܾሻሿ (3)
If the subject maximizes this incorrect expected payoff expression with respect to the offer b, 
then he will set b' = 1 + 0.5݌̅. Importantly, this incorrect offer depends positively on the 
maximum price drawn in the random offer distribution, similar to the random mistake in the 
optimal model with noise. Also, note that this offer function results in a constant ratio for (b'-
$2)/(݌̅ -$2)=0.5 displayed in the Figure 4 above, which appears prominently among those offers 
not near $2. 
 To differentiate empirically between the simple “optimal model with noise” and the “first 
price misconception” explanations in the data, we turn to a familiar quantal choice framework in 
which agents seek to maximize their (perceived) expected payoff, but make (Luce-McFadden) 
logit errors: 
 ܲݎ݋ܾሺ݋݂݂݁ݎ ൌ ௝ܾሻ ൌ ݁
ఒாሾగ|௕ೕሿ
∑ ݁ఒாሾగ|௕ೖሿ௡௞ୀଵ  (4)
Less costly errors (in terms of perceived expected payoffs) are more likely than more costly 
errors. The  term indicates how sensitive subjects are to differences in their expected payoffs. 
For =0 subjects are completely insensitive and choose all feasible offers with equal probability. 
As →∞ the choice model fits perfectly with no error. Of course, we do not claim that all 
subjects should be classified as making choices in one way or another; instead, we use standard 
maximum likelihood methods to fit the data pooled across subjects to the two models and 
estimate the  that best approximates the aggregate behavior. Higher levels of  indicate a better 
fit—requiring less noise to characterize subject choices according to that particular model. 
Below we also estimate a mixture model to determine what fraction of offers are best 
approximated by each model. 
 The log-likelihood, conditional on the first-price misconception (denoted with a 1st 
superscript), depends on the estimated payoff sensitivity 1st and the observed choices yi: 
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 ln ܮଵ௦௧ሺߣଵ௦௧; ݕ௜ሻ ൌ ෍ln ݈௜ଵ௦௧ ൌ ෍lnሼݕ௜݁ఒభೞ೟ாሾగ|௕ೕሿᇱ/Σ
௜௜
݁ఒభೞ೟ாሾగ|௕ೖሿ′ሽ (5)
where yi is an indicator for offer i equal to bj. Similarly, the conditional log-likelihood based on 
the assumption that the optimal and correct model is true (denoted with an OPT superscript) is 
 ln ܮை௉்ሺߣை௉்; ݕ௜ሻ ൌ ෍ln ݈௜ை௉் ൌ ෍lnሼݕ௜݁ఒೀು೅ாሾగ|௕ೕሿ/Σ
௜௜
݁ఒೀು೅ாሾగ|௕ೖሿሽ (6)
Note that other than the different payoff sensitivity parameters, these log-likelihoods differ only 
in whether the correct expected payoff expression E[] from eq. (1) or the misconceived 
expected payoff expression E[]' from eq. (3) is used.15 
 
Result 6 : Among the subjects who do not choose offers within 5 cents of the correct offer of $2, 
the first price misconception model provides a better overall fit than the optimal choice model 
augmented with logit errors, and a much higher fraction of these offers are more consistent with 
the first price misconception model. 
Support: Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the payoff sensitivity 
parameters  along with bootstrapped standard errors and 90 percent confidence intervals. The 
first column is based on all the data and indicates some small differences in fit between the two 
models, but for the Round 1 bids the log-likelihood is considerably higher for the first price 
misconception model. The confidence intervals overlap in that first column, however, and 
subjects who offer the correct $2 clearly do not have the first price misconception nor do they 
make errors. The second column therefore excludes subjects who submitted offers within 5 cents 
of $2, and here the estimated payoff sensitivity terms diverge significantly. For both rounds the 
point estimates are more than three times higher for the misconception model than for the 
optimal model with noise, the confidence intervals are quite different, and the log-likelihood is 
substantially higher for the misconception model. This indicates that while the subjects who do 
not submit offers of $2 do not have the correct idea about the mechanism, they are not merely 
making random errors that are related to the economic cost of the errors. Their offers are better 
characterized by the first price misconception model augmented with a modest level of decision 
error. Finally, the rightmost column displays estimates for the 111 subjects who are most likely 
                                                 
15 For tractability in the estimation, we first aggregate the offer data into 10-cent bins to reduce the dimension of the 
probability vector by one order of magnitude. 
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to have the misconception, either because they reveal it directly on their decision cards (n=29) or 
because on both of their cards their bid was above the drawn random price so we cannot rule out 
this type of misconception (n=82). Obviously the misconception model fits much better for this 
subset of subjects. 
 
Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logit Choice Error Parameter  for Optimal 
and First Price Auction Misconception Models 
 
Model 
 
All Data 
Excluding Offers 
within 5 cents of $2 
Subjects revealing miscon-
ception, or possibly holding it 
Round 1    
Optimal Model OPT 0.99 0.56 0.48 
(standard error) (0.149) (0.130) (0.141) 
[90% confidence] [0.81, 1.26] [0.34, 0.73] [0.25, 0.74] 
observations n=245 n=204 n=111 
Log Likelihood -985.4 -826.8 -449.4 
First Price Auction 
Misconception Model 1st 
 
1.18 
 
1.83 
 
3.05 
(standard error) (0.184) (0.408) (0.624) 
[90% confidence] [0.88, 1.49] [1.30, 2.56] [2.13, 4.20] 
observations n=245 n=204 n=111 
Log Likelihood -954.2 -769.3 -398.2 
Round 2    
Optimal Model OPT 1.12 0.30 0.01 
(standard error) (0.244) (0.164) (0.166) 
[90% confidence] [0.82, 1.51] [0.09, 0.49] [0, 0.41] 
observations n=244 n=168 n=111 
Log Likelihood -979.7 -685.7 -451.6 
First Price Auction 
Misconception Model 1st 
 
0.59 
 
1.03 
 
1.71 
(standard error) (0.115) (0.239) (0.273) 
[90% confidence] [0.39, 0.82] [0.72, 1.53] [1.34, 2.23] 
observations n=244 n=168 n=111 
Log Likelihood -980.5 -660.9 -420.0 
 
 Table 5 reports estimates for a two-parameter finite mixture model that estimates a 
pooled payoff sensitivity parameter and the probability  that the optimal model or the first 
price misconception model applies to these same three samples (Harrison and Ruström, 2009). 
The grand likelihood that combines the two models is constructed as a probability weighted 
average of the conditional likelihoods, where  denotes the probability that the (error-
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augmented) first price misconception model is correct:16  
 ln ܮሺߣ, ߠெ; ݕ௜ሻ ൌ ෍lnሼሺ1 െ ߠெሻ ݈௜ை௉் ൅ ߠெ݈௜ଵ௦௧ሽ
௜
 (7)
The results show that nearly two-thirds of all the offers are more consistent with the 
misconception in Round 1, and this fraction rises to 80 percent or more for the subsets of data in 
columns 2 and 3. The probability that an offer is more consistent with the misconception model 
is estimated reasonably accurately, and for Round 1 the 90% confidence interval never includes 
an equal likelihood of the two models (i.e., =0.5). 
 
Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Finite Mixture Model Logit Choice Error 
Parameter  and Likelihood of First Price Auction Misconception Model M 
 
Model 
 
All Data 
Excluding Offers 
within 5 cents of $2 
Subjects revealing miscon-
ception, or possibly holding it 
Round 1    
Payoff Sensitivity  4.49 4.19 5.14 
(standard error) (0.839) (0.574) (1.205) 
[90% confidence] [3.41, 6.08] [3.29, 5.22] [3.44, 7.52] 
Misconception Prob M 0.65 0.86 0.91 
(standard error) (0.046) (0.0.38) (0.045) 
[90% confidence] [0.59, 0.74] [0.79, 0.91] [0.83, 0.98] 
observations n=245 n=204 n=111 
Log Likelihood -932.4 -750.2 -394.4 
Round 2    
Payoff Sensitivity  2.65 2.26 1.71 
(standard error) (0.824) (0.437) (0.333) 
[90% confidence] [1.68, 4.67] [1.64, 3.04] [1.28, 2.32] 
Misconception Prob M 0.42 0.80 1.00 
(standard error) (0.059) (0.050) (0.010) 
[90% confidence] [0.34, 0.54] [0.71, 0.88] [1.00, 1.00] 
observations n=244 n=168 n=111 
Log Likelihood -962.5 -652.4 -420.0 
                                                 
16 This approach assumes that any offer can come from both models, but it includes the boundary case where one 
model or the other completely generates the offer. Alternative approaches and interpretations are possible (El-Gamal 
and Grether, 1995). 
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Figure 6, Panel A: Comparison of Fitted Correct (Optimal) and First Price Misconception 
Models with Noise, for Subjects Not Bidding within 5 cents of $2 (Round 1) 
 
 
  
Figure 6, Panel B: Comparison of Fitted Correct (Optimal) and First Price Misconception 
Models with Noise, for Subjects Not Bidding within 5 cents of $2 (Round 2) 
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 Figure 6 illustrates the fit of the correct and first price misconception models for the 
offers not within 5 cents of the true value of $2 (i.e., based on the middle column of Table 4). 
Adding noise to the optimal model (the dotted red line) leads to higher mean expected offers 
because offers can be spread between zero and the maximum random price.17 For  near 0 (as in 
Panel B) the offers are nearly uniformly distributed over this range, so the mean is near the range 
midpoint (i.e., a mean offer of $3 if the maximum random price is $6). Increases in  shift this 
predicted mean downwards towards the horizontal line at the correct offer of $2. The higher 
dashed lines on this figure show the first price misconception model. For near 0 offers 
according to this model are similar to the optimal model, but increases in shift the mean offers 
upward towards 1 + 0.5݌̅. This figure illustrates how the mean bids are better approximated by 
the first price misconception model, although this model over-predicts the level of the mean 
when the maximum random price takes on its highest values. 
On one hand, the comparison of models yields a consistent pattern of failure of 
unmodified revealed preference theory and of framing theories. The BDM does not result in an 
accurate measure of the preference that is known to exist.  A direct application of revealed 
preference theory does not suggest a reason why.  Application of framing theories leads to a 
substantial misspecification of the preference. On the other hand, the theory of game form 
misconception proves helpful.  Close examination of the data demonstrates that the problem 
resides with the BDM.  The choices of many of these untrained subjects appear to be based on a 
misconception of the task.  They think that it is a first price auction rather than a second price 
auction.  That insight provides a key tool with which to apply the theory of game form 
misconception.  The subjects consist of two groups. One group understands the game form as a 
second price auction and behaves substantially as game theory predicts.  The other group has a 
misconception of the game form as a first price auction and under that model behaves 
substantially as game theory predicts. The classical “rational choice” models from auction theory 
give the best account. While repeated choice tends to alert some subjects about their 
misconception the most powerful correction comes with exposure to their mistake and its 
associated cost.  
                                                 
17 Subjects were not actually restricted from making any offer, but they apparently viewed the maximum random 
price as a logical upper bound since only two of the 489 offers stated in the experiment were greater than this 
maximum random price. 
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Section 6. Concluding Summary and Observations 
This experiment demonstrates the failure of game form recognition (FGFR) in the context of a 
very simple BDM preference measurement exercise.  Two general points follow from the 
demonstration. First, misconceptions should be taken seriously as an explanatory theory of 
choice even in controlled laboratory experiments conducted using a simple BDM measurement.  
It is not the case that choices can be interpreted as revealing an unbiased preference.  Second, the 
influence of context can be misinterpreted as reflecting the shape of a preference or even 
constructing a preference because the data from BDM can be mistakenly interpreted as support 
for framing theory.  The experiment produces phenomena often cited as evidence of framing 
effects. In particular, the FGFR phenomenon can masquerade as support for the theory of 
framing such as through preferences constructed from reference points.   
Our research strategy is to study commodities with such an obvious induced preference 
that there would seem to be nothing to test.  A dollar is worth a dollar.  Since we know the 
preference for the commodity, we can focus on the measurement method, its reliability and 
interpretations of the measurements through a comparison with the known preference.  Does the 
method accurately measure what it is designed to measure or are other elements of the context 
incorporated in the measurement?  Clearly, this experiment is only an example but it serves to 
demonstrate the existence of a mismeasurement problem that can accompany applications of the 
BDM.  
The simplicity of the experiment avoids concerns raised in other contexts that controlling 
for misconceptions in tests of endowment effect theory might have confounding influences. 
Previous experiments demonstrate that when subjects are well trained on the features of the 
BDM a WTA/WTP gap for mugs does not exist but when subjects are not trained with the use of 
the BDM the WTA/WTP gap for mugs is observed. (Plott and Zeiler, 2005; Isoni et al., 2011). 
Kőszegi and Rabin question those experiments and presumably the replications, based on a 
concern that the training prevents the formation of appropriate reference points.18 Kahneman 
suggests that the training subjects with the BDM leads them to choose according to the theory 
                                                 
18 For instance, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, page 1142) argue “One interpretation of the rare exceptions to laboratory 
findings of the [endowment] effect, such as Plott and Zeiler [2005], is that they have successfully decoupled 
subjects’ expectations from their initial ownership status. Similarly, the field experiment by List [2003], which 
replicates the effect for inexperienced sports card collectors but finds that experienced collectors show a much 
smaller, insignificant effect, is consistent with our theory if more experienced traders come to expect a high 
probability of parting with items they have just acquired.” 
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preferred by the experimenter.19 Our experiments involve no extensive training with the BDM so 
those concerns do not apply. Moreover, there are no avenues for framing based theories of 
attachments, affiliations or enhancements to find their way to modify preferences: one dollar is 
worth one dollar.  
Our results do have implications for theory.  The simple existence of mistakes causes no 
particularly new problems for the theory of revealed preference.  Many problems of mistakes and 
poor measurements are addressed in the literature in one form or another.20 However, systematic 
mistakes can result in a misspecification of the revealed preference and thus present a challenge 
to the theory of choice, the theory of preference and the theory of decision processes, each of 
which is a separate development. The data from our experiments are examples and might benefit 
from a theory of “perception” to supplement the other context driven, individual characteristics 
used in economic theory (decision types, subjective probabilities, learning, temporary equilibria 
and even physiologically driven preferences such as hunger or sexual attraction). But the 
example with the word “LEFT” in Figure 1 suggests that additional theory might be useful.  
Clearly the choice from among the ovals does not reveal a fully informed preference until 
additional information is provided.21 The implication is that “improving” the BDM method from 
the point of view of revealed preference theory may be considerably more complex than simply 
using different instructions or training procedures.  
 The phenomenon of misconceptions raises different problems for typical applications of 
framing theory, which attaches preference to choice as a matter of a definition.  Framing is 
advanced as an alternative to a broad theory of “rational choice,” which we assume means the 
                                                 
19 Kahneman (2011, p. 471) criticizes Plott and Zeiler (2005) because “they devised an elaborate training procedure 
in which participants experienced the roles of both buyers and sellers, and were explicitly taught to assess their true 
values… Psychologists would consider the method severely deficient, because it communicates to the participants a 
message of what the experimenters consider appropriate behavior, which happens to coincide with the 
experimenter’s theory.”  We find this claim by Kahneman puzzling.  The training process used by Plott and Zeiler 
concerns the method of measurement in order to reduce game form misconceptions, and not the preference for the 
objects being measured which is the focus of the research. Plott and Zeiler also included experiments in which 
training was absent but were overlooked by Kahneman  
20 For decades economic models have added random variables to account for the fact that choices found in field 
environments and in experimental environments reveal inexplicable changes. Therefore addition of the randomness 
produces extremely powerful models when applied at both the field level (e.g., Echenique et al., 2011) and 
experiments as is exhibited by the first price auction model used above.  
21 Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) suggest that “information” is the theoretical tool that can account for mistakes while 
maintaining the classical theory of preference.  However, how information is presented can be a central issue. 
Information, when accompanied by “helpful hints” can be even more effective.  For example, the black lines added 
to Figure 1 can be interpreted as information, as can the helpful hint to look at the white parts and not the black 
puzzle looking figures.   
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existence of an exogenous preference, even though the term is typically not defined by framing 
theory. According to framing theory as developed by Kahneman and Tversky a preference is 
constructed from a “frame” instead of being exogenously determined.  
 The frame is interpreted very broadly and includes both the game form and perceptions 
of the game form. Departing from economic theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) incorporate 
the perception of the game form within the frame. They make the point clearly; “We use the term 
‘decision frame’ to refer to the decision-makers conception of the acts, outcomes and 
contingencies associated with a particular choice” (page 453). This incorporation merges 
concepts and distinctions that economics traditionally keeps separate, namely, the preferences 
over outcomes and the perceived relationship between outcomes and the instruments of choice 
(the game form).   
A change in the frame therefore becomes associated with a change of preference. Thus, 
according to framing theory the preference for the card in our experiment is defined to be the 
measurement provided by the BDM, typically above $2.00, as opposed to the $2.00 known 
value.  That is, according to framing theory almost all of the subjects in our experiments have a 
“kink” in their preference for the card such that the value for keeping the card is greater than the 
value they would pay for the card.  Similarly, framing theory holds that the preference for the 
ovals in Figure 1 is defined by the original choice and that any change of choice that results from 
the additional information provided by the thick lines involves a violation of an axiom of 
“invariance” and is thus a violation of rational choice. Framing theory is offered to fill the 
resulting void. Changes in the perception of the game form come to be interpreted as changes in 
preferences and thus as violations of some form of rationality. 
The concepts of misconceptions and mistakes highlighted in this study break the crucial 
connection between preference and choice in framing theory. We know the stated choice is a 
mistake because we induced an objective preference, and this is confirmed by the systematic 
reduction in the mistake across rounds. Since the choice reflects a misconception rather than a 
preference there is there is no necessary reason for the axiom of invariance to be satisfied as the 
frame changes.  Choices that do not satisfy the property of invariance can be mistakes and thus 
need not be based on framing theory. Interestingly, the theory of rational preference and choice, 
which framing theory seeks to reject, actually provides an explanation of our experimental 
results. The theory of bidding in first-price auctions explains part of the data and the dynamics of 
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choice adjustment and learning through feedback and exposure to errors toward the optimal offer 
explain more.  
Sensitivity to context is to be expected and is even part of the standard economic theory. 
The evidence from economics and the standard theory itself hold that changes in context can 
have substantial influence on choice.  Indeed, many aspects of economics predict that context 
influences on choice.  Changing information, prices, institutions, beliefs, etc. are all examples of 
context influence that are fully understood in terms of traditional theory. However, it does not 
follow that preferences, as opposed to choices or decisions, are influenced by context.  
Furthermore, it does not follow that the influences of context on choice should be of concern to 
those interested in theories of rationality.  
Some important criticisms of standard economic theory suffer from limited robustness.22 
The variability of results is understandable if one accepts the evidence presented here that 
systematic misconceptions of the game form affect the widely-used BDM preference elicitation 
method. A root cause may be misconceptions related to game form together with a variety of 
instructions used by different researchers. However, we hasten to point out that we have 
produced no general theory of game form misconceptions. Since the nature of misconceptions is 
context dependent, in the absence of a specific theory, falsifiability of any proposed general 
theory is problematic. 
Can the BDM be developed to accommodate both the need to avoid game form 
misconceptions while also avoiding contaminating procedures from the point of view of framing 
theory? We have not addressed that question, and how it might be addressed depends on one’s 
understanding of framing and framing theory.  Economics rests on the hypothesis that 
preferences exist, can be measured and that a clear distinction exists between a preference and a 
decision. The addition of random variables to model preferences from decision data such as the 
logit model used here are illustrations.  By contrast, the theory of framing appears to rest on the 
assumption that preferences cannot be known independent of the frame and perhaps are even 
created/constructed by the frame.  Thus, the constructed preference perspective of framing 
results in an unclear meaning of “preference measurement” and certainly leaves ambiguous the 
                                                 
22 For example, some WTA/WTP gaps go away with greater subject experience (Plott and Zeiler, 2005; Isoni et al., 
2011), anchoring and adjustment effects are much smaller in some studies (compare Fudenberg et al., 2012 to Ariely 
et al., 2003), and manipulations of expectations of a trade do not have predicted impacts on reference dependence 
(Goette et al., 2012). 
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meaning of “improved measurement.” More training or detailed descriptions, including a 
summary of the incentive-compatibility of the BDM mechanism sometimes used in instructions, 
changes the frame and thus the preference according to framing theory. Thus, it might be 
impossible to determine if measurement is improved under the maintained assumption of 
framing theory.  
The discussion of BDM draws attention to a closely related controversy.  Our 
experimental results, and in particular the changed choice for many individuals who were 
exposed to a mistake, suggest that experience works through a process of evolving game form 
recognition. Thus, according to that idea, the field experiments conducted by List (2003) differ 
from the data generated by untrained laboratory subjects because the subjects from the field are 
familiar with the game form and do not have the same game form misconceptions as untrained 
subjects or inexperienced participants in the field. Gigerenzer et al. (2008) gives us a hint 
suggesting that the concept of recognition heuristics might be useful in economics, which is 
consistent with a focus on the process of decision making as opposed the development of an 
underlying preference. 
We were drawn to this research by a controversy that exists in the literature. We conclude 
that the controversy stems from a missing element of theory: A solid connection between the 
game form and individual's understanding of the game form. The needed theory might be related 
to perception, logic, learning or other phenomena. We do not know how to close the gap, and we 
suspect it will require input from a variety of disciplines outside economics.  We hope that the 
experiment reported here calls attention to the fact that the task is not addressed by revealed 
preference theory and the gap is not closed by the theory of framing. 
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